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Grutter at Work: A Title VII Critique of
Constitutional Affirmative Action
abstract. This Note argues that Title VII doctrine both illuminates internal
contradictions of Grutter v. Bollinger and provides a framework for reading the opinion. Grutter’s
diversity rationale is a broad endorsement of integration that hinges on the quantitative concept
of critical mass, but the opinion’s narrow-tailoring discussion instead points to a model of racial
difference that champions subjective decisionmaking and threatens to jettison numerical
accountability. Title VII doctrine supports a reading of Grutter that privileges a view of diversity
as integration and therefore cautions against the opinion’s conception of narrow tailoring.
Grutter, in turn, can productively inform employment discrimination law. The opinion reaffirms
principles of contested Title VII precedent and suggests how employers might use affirmative
action to meaningfully integrate their workforces.
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to Vicki Schultz for teaching that inspired this Note and generous suggestions throughout the
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introduction
Grutter v. Bollinger1 transformed affirmative action jurisprudence.
Resuscitating Bakke,2 and renovating it in the process, Grutter has invigorated
educational affirmative action programs and changed the terms of the
affirmative action debate in other contexts, most notably employment. While
the Court in the past twenty-five years has limited affirmative action to the
strictly remedial context for public employers, and lent only slightly more
leeway to private employers, Grutter promises to expand employers’ range of
legal justifications. The opinion introduces a rich understanding of diversity
that emphasizes values of integration—guaranteeing and signaling that
American institutions are open to all, facilitating cross-racial understanding,
and breaking down stereotypes—for both particular institutions and society at
large. Grutter’s diversity is not the diversity of difference that stands as an
alternative to remediation, but rather a diversity of integration that extends the
remedial rationale from backward-looking compensation to forward-looking
solutions to racial segregation and hierarchy.
Because Grutter’s conception of diversity has remedial resonances and, even
more so, because the opinion focuses on society’s need for meaningful
integration, the implications of Grutter’s holding cannot be contained by
university walls. Yet while several scholars have asked whether courts will
import Grutter’s diversity rationale into the employment context,3 none has
taken up the issue that formed the fault line between Grutter and its companion
case, Gratz v. Bollinger4: narrow tailoring.5 In this Note, I explore the

1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

539 U.S. 306 (2003).
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative
Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2005); Michael L. Foreman et al.,
The Continuing Relevance of Race-Conscious Remedies and Programs in Integrating the Nation’s
Workforce, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 81 (2004); Allan G. King & Jeremy W. Hawpe,
Gratz v. Grutter: Lessons for Pursuing Diversity in the Workplace, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 41
(2004); Eric A. Tilles, Lessons from Bakke: The Effect of Grutter on Affirmative Action in
Employment, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 451 (2004); Ronald Turner, Grutter, The Diversity
Justification, and Workplace Affirmative Action, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 199 (2004); Rebecca Hanner
White, Affirmative Action in the Workplace: The Significance of Grutter, 92 KY. L.J. 263 (2003);
Bryan W. Leach, Note, Race as Mission Critical: The Occupational Need Rationale in Military
Affirmative Action and Beyond, 113 YALE L.J. 1093 (2004).
539 U.S. 244 (2003).
See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 3, at 15 (“My focus here will be chiefly on the ‘why’—on the
justifications for affirmative action under Grutter. But the ‘how’ and the ‘how much’ . . .
have important implications for workplace affirmative action as well.”); Leach, supra note 3,
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implications of Grutter’s narrow-tailoring discussion for employment
discrimination law and further ask how employment discrimination law might
guide interpretations of Grutter. Though Grutter sheds new light on the
constitutionality of public employers’ affirmative action programs, I focus on
Title VII law, which covers both public and private employers and which many
lower courts have interpreted as less permissive of nonremedial affirmative
action.6 I contend that Title VII illuminates Grutter’s internal contradictions
and provides a framework for reading the opinion, and that Grutter, in turn,
can productively inform employment affirmative action plans.
In Part I, I describe the tension in Justice O’Connor’s Grutter opinion
between two forms of diversity: diversity-as-integration and diversity-asdifference. Diversity-as-difference7 understands racial diversity as a proxy for
viewpoint diversity and stresses the educational value of interaction among
students with different backgrounds and perspectives. Diversity-asintegration, by contrast, emphasizes our nation’s history of racism,
segregation, and inequality, and regards race not as a proxy for viewpoint but
as itself the salient category: Racial diversity breaks down current barriers to
equal opportunity both directly, by opening institutions to all racial groups and
reducing de facto segregation, and indirectly, by bringing members of different
races into sustained contact that challenges stereotypes and fosters interracial
connectedness.8 While Grutter’s compelling-interest discussion champions
diversity-as-integration and the related quantitative concept of critical mass,

6.

7.
8.

at 1100 (“This Note does not address the narrow-tailoring dimension of the strict scrutiny
test, yet this is not to overlook its importance . . . .”).
Title VII exempts race from its bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) provision,
which allows employers to rely on an employee’s sex, religion, or national origin when it is
necessary to the business’s operation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000). Thus, under Title VII,
courts have struck down affirmative action plans that cast racial diversity as a business need.
See, e.g., Knight v. Nassau County Civil Serv. Comm’n, 649 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1981); Miller
v. Tex. State Bd. of Barber Exam’rs, 615 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1980). But when similar plans
have been challenged under the Constitution, some courts have accepted an operational
need defense. See, e.g., Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2002). See
generally Leach, supra note 3 (discussing the tension between statutory and constitutional
approaches to the “occupational need” defense). Notably, under Title VII, a valid affirmative
action plan serves not as an affirmative defense but rather as a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for the challenged employment decision, see Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S.
616, 616 (1987), and, as I discuss, Grutter’s diversity rationale for affirmative action is
significantly broader than the operational need defense, see infra Section I.A.
The phrase is Cynthia Estlund’s. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The
Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 82 (2000).
See Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1195, 1196-97 (2002); Estlund, supra note 3, at 16-17.
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the opinion’s narrow-tailoring discussion insists on an individualized
decisionmaking process that endorses diversity-as-difference.
To resolve this internal tension, I argue in Part II that Title VII doctrine9
supports a reading of Grutter based on diversity-as-integration. Grutter’s
narrow-tailoring discussion conflicts with standards that have shaped
employment discrimination law. Whereas Grutter applauds individualized,
subjective decisionmaking and seems to reject numerical accountability, courts
evaluating Title VII claims have expressed skepticism about subjective
decisionmaking, which is readily infected by bias, and have demanded
numerical benchmarks. Title VII law’s longstanding engagement with
affirmative action has yielded the manifest imbalance standard, which requires
that affirmative action plans use numerical goals pegged to labor markets.10
Applying this logic to Grutter suggests a demographically derived standard for
integration that falls between rigid quotas11 and the opinion’s inward-looking
critical mass inquiry.
Finally, in Part III, I explore Grutter’s consequences for Title VII doctrine.
While the opinion’s narrow-tailoring analysis threatens employment
discrimination law more than it threatens educational affirmative action,
Grutter’s diversity-as-integration rationale and its attendant concept of critical

9.

10.

11.

1412

My discussion of Title VII focuses on judicial interpretations of the statute, but as scholars
have recognized, employment discrimination law is partially constructed by the
interpretations of nonjudicial actors, such as employers, human resource managers, and
academic commentators. Development of Title VII doctrine therefore reflects an elaborate
process of both legal and cultural construal. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity
Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1589 (2001) [hereinafter Edelman,
Diversity Rhetoric]; Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures:
Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531 (1992) [hereinafter
Edelman, Symbolic Structures]; Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, How Affirmative Action Became
Diversity Management, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 960 (1998).
Title VII’s manifest imbalance standard defines the background justification for affirmative
action: An employer may implement a plan if there is a statistical disparity between the
racial composition of the workforce and the relevant labor pool. An acceptable affirmative
action plan will therefore have numerical goals and timetables designed to bring the
workforce more in line with the local labor market. See, e.g., Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631-40.
Rigid quotas are problematic not only for opponents of affirmative action but also for
supporters. While numerical goals and benchmarks lie at the heart of effective affirmative
action plans, strict quotas may undermine some of integration’s central goals by
stigmatizing affirmative action beneficiaries. See Marylee C. Taylor, Impact of Affirmative
Action on Beneficiary Groups: Evidence From the 1990 General Social Survey, 15 BASIC & APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 143 (1994) (stressing the difference between rigid quotas and using race as a
plus factor); see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations
After Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1259-70 (1998) (reviewing research suggesting
that certain affirmative action plans may exacerbate intergroup bias and cause selfderogation among affirmative action beneficiaries).
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mass reaffirm the broad view of Title VII that Supreme Court precedent sets
forth, but that lower courts and Supreme Court dicta have since eroded. The
diversity-as-integration rationale suggests that employers may implement
affirmative action plans not only to compensate for their own past
discrimination but also to rectify workforce imbalances, and that they may use
general labor market figures to determine whether there are imbalances. In
addition, Grutter’s critical mass standard complements the manifest imbalance
inquiry and underscores that employment discrimination law would benefit
from bringing Grutter to the workplace.
i. grutter’s diversity
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Grutter has shifted the terms of an
affirmative action debate long focused on the distinction between diversity and
remedial rationales. Embracing the former, Grutter recasts diversity to
encompass integration and therefore defines the diversity rationale not as an
alternative to the remedial rationale, but as an extension of it.12 When the
Court turns to narrow-tailoring analysis, however, it relies on Bakke’s
requirement of individualized consideration for every applicant, a constraint
that emphasizes racial difference over meaningful integration.13 This deep
divide in the opinion is expressed in three interrelated tensions: While the
compelling-interest discussion champions diversity-as-integration, the benefits
of diverse institutions to society at large, and the use of critical mass to achieve
integration, the narrow-tailoring discussion champions diversity-as-difference,
the benefits of diversity only within institutions, and individualized
consideration for each applicant that precludes attention to numerical
benchmarks.
A. The Compelling Interest: Diversity-as-Integration
In Grutter, a clear majority of the Court held for the first time that “student
body diversity is a compelling state interest.”14 The Court drew on Justice
Powell’s Bakke opinion, but transformed as much as revived it. Powell argued
that universities have a compelling interest in selecting students who will

12.
13.
14.

See infra Section I.A.
See infra Section I.B.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
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contribute most to the “robust exchange of ideas.”15 By using race as a proxy
for viewpoint diversity, Powell articulated a conception of diversity-asdifference: Racial diversity was valuable inasmuch as it brought different
perspectives to university classrooms and fostered lively discussion.
Grutter articulates a new conception of diversity-as-integration that
conceives of both diversity and educational purposes more expansively than
Bakke. Whereas Bakke assumed a link between race and viewpoint, at least in
the aggregate,16 Grutter relies in part on the very absence of such a nexus and
champions intraracial diversity.17 The opinion regards race not as a proxy for
viewpoint, but as itself salient: More important than the likelihood that racial
minorities will bring unique perspectives to the university is the recognition
that race triggers stereotypes, prejudice, and isolation.18 Despite emphasizing
race as such, Grutter’s vision of what race means is deeply contingent. The
opinion gestures toward a world in which racial diversity will simply yield “a
student body that looks different.”19 But Grutter acknowledges that this is not
yet our world, for racial minorities are likely to have unique life experiences

15.
16.
17.

18.

19.

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 579-80 (1990) (discussing Bakke), overruled by
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319-20, 333. Even when Justice O’Connor echoes Bakke in
claiming that classroom discussion is more interesting when students have a variety of
backgrounds, id. at 330, she emphasizes intraracial diversity: “Just as growing up in a
particular region or having particular professional experiences is likely to affect an
individual’s views, so too is one’s own, unique experience of being a racial minority in a
society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still matters.” Id. at 333 (emphasis added).
See id. at 330 (noting the problem of racial stereotypes); Elizabeth S. Anderson, Racial
Integration as a Compelling Interest, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 15, 28 (2004); Estlund, supra note
3, at 17; see also Claude M. Steele et al., Contending with Group Image: The Psychology of
Stereotype and Social Identity Threat, 34 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 379 (2002)
(discussing stereotype threat, which leads minority students to underperform because of
concerns that their performance might confirm a negative stereotype about their racial
group).
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945 (5th Cir. 1996). Hopwood invoked this thin conception
of race to reject the diversity rationale. See id.; Reva B. Siegel, The Racial Rhetorics of
Colorblind Constitutionalism: The Case of Hopwood v. Texas, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION:
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 29, 40-48 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin eds., 1998). But Grutter
suggests that such a thin conception would be a significant accomplishment for equal
protection. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (discussing the importance of eliminating racial
stereotypes); cf. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 315 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“[O]ne of the most important lessons that the American public schools teach is
that the diverse ethnic, cultural, and national backgrounds that have been brought together
in our famous ‘melting pot’ do not identify essential differences among the human beings
that inhabit our land.”).
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“[b]y virtue of our Nation’s struggle with racial inequality.”20 The opinion
destabilizes views of racial difference not by embracing a thin conception of
race or by demanding assimilation, but rather by emphasizing intraracial
difference and casting the university as a locus of change where students of all
races break down stereotypes and forge connections and new identities.21
Equally central to Grutter’s diversity-as-integration rationale is the Court’s
belief that educational diversity will foster integration in society at large.
Grutter posits that diverse universities are instrumental to realizing extrinsic
social goals, such as preparing students to work in “an increasingly diverse
workforce,”22 participate as citizens in American society,23 and serve as “leaders
with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry.”24 Integration signals that
institutions and paths to leadership are open to members of all races, and this
both bolsters the legitimacy of such institutions in the public eye and
dynamically facilitates integration by suggesting to minorities that it is
worthwhile to invest in their human capital.25 Training its eye on “the dream of
one Nation, indivisible,”26 Grutter delivers on the promise of Brown, not the
more limited promise of Bakke.27
Grutter’s rich understanding of diversity-as-integration generates two
interwoven doctrinal innovations. First, the Court suggests that diversity and
remediation need not be mutually exclusive rationales for affirmative action.28

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

25.
26.
27.
28.

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338.
See id. at 330; Anderson, supra note 8, at 1207; Kenneth L. Karst, The Revival of ForwardLooking Affirmative Action, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 60, 72 (2004).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (citation omitted).
Id. at 332.
Id.; see Anderson, supra note 18, at 23; Joel K. Goldstein, Beyond Bakke: Grutter—Gratz and
the Promise of Brown, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 899, 946-52 (2004); Robert C. Post, The Supreme
Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117
HARV. L. REV. 4, 60 (2003). As Justice Scalia’s dissent underscores, these are not educational
purposes in any narrow sense, Grutter, 539 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), but because Grutter defines educational benefits broadly, it avoids the
“ominous implications of Powell’s reasoning, which sharply separated social justice from
educational aims,” Anderson, supra note 8, at 1217.
See Anderson, supra note 8.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.
See Anderson, supra note 18, at 15; Goldstein, supra note 24, at 902; Linda S. Greene, From
Brown to Grutter, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 2 (2004).
Prior to Grutter, the diversity argument was regarded as an alternative to remedial
arguments. See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990), overruled by
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932,
948-49 (5th Cir. 1996).

1415

BULMAN-POZEN

the yale law journal

3/23/2006 6:58:51 PM

115:1408

2006

Grutter infuses the diversity rationale with remedial justifications29 and
expands the remedial rationale in turn: Instead of looking to the past, Grutter
looks to the future; instead of noting only the benefits that accrue to minority
groups, Grutter notes the benefits to society at large; and instead of demanding
that particular wrongdoers compensate particular victims, Grutter allows those
in a position to facilitate integration to act affirmatively. This last point is
Grutter’s second doctrinal innovation: The decision suggests a new openness to
unit-level responses to racial inequality. Previous equal protection cases had
insisted that institutions could not respond to societal discrimination because it
was “too amorphous a basis” for remediation,30 but Grutter suggests the
relevant inquiry should be whether an institution is currently in a position to
foster integration,31 and it casts institutional initiatives as the most tenable
solution to lingering segregation and inequality.
The concept of critical mass operationalizes Grutter’s commitment to
diversity-as-integration by ensuring interracial representation and, especially,
by facilitating cross-racial understanding and undermining stereotypes. The
Court defines critical mass as “a number that encourages underrepresented
minority students to participate in the classroom and not feel isolated” or “like
spokespersons for their race.”32 As such, a critical mass guarantees that
minority students are not “tokens” who are targets for biased judgment and
particularly susceptible to performance pressures and demands either to
conform or to fit stereotyped roles.33 Grutter recognizes that a low number of
minority students is not only a potential sign of discrimination but a cause of
it,34 so the presence of a critical mass at once evidences fair and open
admissions policies and reduces discrimination. Although the opinion defines
critical mass in qualitative terms, moreover, it is a fundamentally quantitative
inquiry, and Grutter’s reliance on critical mass implicitly recognizes that the

29.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Greene, supra note 27, at 16; Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1538
(2004).
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion).
See Jack Greenberg, Diversity, the University, and the World Outside, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1610,
1621 (2003); Greene, supra note 27, at 18.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318-19 (2003).
See ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 242 (1977); Steele,
supra note 18, at 423.
See, e.g., KANTER, supra note 33, at 242; Michael J. Yelnosky, The Prevention Justification for
Affirmative Action, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1385 (2003).
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integrative project must employ the numerical goals that define remedial
affirmative action.35
B. Narrow Tailoring: Diversity-as-Difference
While Grutter’s discussion of the law school’s compelling interest suggests
a model of diversity-as-integration, its narrow-tailoring analysis points in
almost the opposite direction, toward a conception of diversity-as-difference
that stresses individualized consideration and eschews numerical
accountability. The opinion articulates several components of narrow
tailoring,36 but—as Grutter’s companion case, Gratz, highlights37—evaluating
applicants as individuals is “paramount.”38 Read together, the opinions
demand flexible, holistic review of each applicant and proscribe racial quotas
and mechanical bonuses for race.
The requirement that applicants be considered as individuals descends
directly from Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion, which argued that the “denial . . .
of th[e] right to individualized consideration” was the “principal evil” of the
medical school admissions program in question.39 By embracing Powell’s
insistence that a school consider “all the ways an applicant might contribute to
a diverse educational environment,”40 Grutter also endorses his diversity-asdifference rationale41 and the proxy relationship between race and diversity he
identified—a search for diverse viewpoints, backgrounds, and experiences

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

40.

41.

See infra notes 122-131 and accompanying text for a more extensive discussion of critical
mass.
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339-42.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (striking down the University of Michigan’s
undergraduate admissions plan that gave a fixed bonus to every minority applicant).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 n.52 (opinion of Powell, J.)); cf. Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution protect persons, not groups.”)
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337; see also Gratz, 539 U.S. at 279 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he
law school’s admissions plan . . . enables admissions officers to make nuanced judgments
with respect to the contributions each applicant is likely to make to the diversity of the
incoming class.”).
Cf. Post, supra note 24, at 71-72 (noting that Grutter’s requirement of individualized
consideration must have “a different theoretical foundation” from the compelling-interest
standard).
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linked to race—rather than the direct consideration of race necessary to a
diversity-as-integration plan.42
Paradoxically, even as Grutter’s narrow-tailoring discussion resists defining
race in terms of a “specific and identifiable” contribution to diversity,43 it
demands an inquiry linked to a static view of racial identity: What diversity
contribution will this student, because of characteristics associated with her
race, rather than the fact that she is a racial minority, make to the class?44 By
focusing on viewpoint and background over race itself, admissions officers
might admit only those minority students who appear to represent distinct
experiences and perspectives, and this would constrain the diversity-asintegration project.
One might argue that such constraint is just the point: Individualized
consideration does not derive from and facilitate the compelling interest;
rather, the narrow-tailoring requirement limits the compelling interest to
protect “‘individuals who are not members of the favored racial and ethnic
groups.’”45 By this account, considering applicants as individuals is not a means
to realize a school’s interest in racial diversity but rather a means to cabin it. Yet
this is not how Grutter presents the relationship: “The purpose of the narrow
tailoring requirement is to ensure that ‘the means chosen “fit” th[e] compelling
goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the
classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.’”46 Ironically, it is
the individualized consideration Grutter’s narrow-tailoring prong demands
that threatens to facilitate a stereotype-laden search for connections between
race and viewpoint. Even assuming that narrow tailoring should constrain an

42.

43.
44.

45.
46.

A recent First Circuit case underscores this characterization, interpreting Grutter’s emphasis
on individualized consideration as a means to realize viewpoint diversity, even as it
distinguishes the case at hand: “Unlike the Gratz and Grutter policies, the Lynn Plan is
designed to achieve racial diversity rather than viewpoint diversity. The only relevant
criterion, then, is a student’s race; individualized consideration beyond that is irrelevant to
the compelling interest.” Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2005).
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271.
See id. at 272-73 (describing the touted Harvard College program, in which “‘the critical
criteria are often individual qualities or experience not dependent upon race but sometimes
associated with it’” (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.))); see also Richard T. Ford, Beyond “Difference”: A Reluctant Critique of
Legal Identity Politics, in LEFT LEGALISM / LEFT CRITIQUE 38, 46-48 (Wendy Brown & Janet
Halley eds., 2002). See generally RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE
(2005).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341 (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 630 (1990)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493
(1989) (plurality opinion)).

1418

BULMAN-POZEN

3/23/2006 6:58:51 PM

grutter at work

institution’s means, moreover, it must not undermine the compelling interest
altogether,47 and by substituting diversity-as-difference, Grutter’s insistence on
individual consideration threatens to undermine diversity-as-integration.
The tension between Grutter’s compelling-interest and narrow-tailoring
discussions is clearest in the opinion’s treatment of numerical goals. While the
compelling-interest discussion invokes critical mass—a decisively quantitative,
if flexible, inquiry essential to realizing the opinion’s remedial commitments—
the Court then suggests that narrow tailoring does not permit sustained
attention to the numbers. In response to the dissenters’ strenuous objection
that the law school’s interest in critical mass renders its program a quota
system, Justice O’Connor emphasizes that the admissions committee did not
base decisions on numerical benchmarks; she does not challenge the dissenters’
equation outright.48 If the goal is diversity-as-integration that brings together
meaningful numbers of racially diverse students, however, attention to the
numbers should legitimate a plan, not invalidate it.
One thoughtful, if unsettling, reading regards Grutter’s narrow-tailoring
analysis as a political compromise that permits numerical benchmarks as long
as institutions camouflage the value assigned to race and therefore minimize
the threat of stigma and balkanization.49 This interpretation is certainly
plausible given that the law school program the Court upheld seems to
incorporate numerical goals. But Grutter’s legacy depends on both its holding
and its reasoning, and courts and commentators have seized on the opinion’s
narrow-tailoring analysis.50 This is, after all, the fault line between Grutter and

47.

48.

49.

50.

See id. at 340 (holding that the law school need not use a lottery system or decrease its
emphasis on GPA and LSAT scores because “these alternatives would require a dramatic
sacrifice of diversity, the academic quality of all admitted students, or both”).
See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. 336 (noting that admissions officers “never gave race any more or
less weight based on” daily reports that tracked the racial and ethnic composition of the
class); see also id. at 318.
See Post, supra note 24, at 75; cf. Girardeau A. Spann, Neutralizing Grutter, 7 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 633, 652-56 (2005) (recognizing, though not supporting, this “camouflage” approach).
This approach suggests that visible bonuses for race engender stigma and resentment. But
cf. Taylor, supra note 11 (finding that African-American recipients of affirmative action
showed no negative effects regarding job satisfaction, life satisfaction, and in-group selfesteem and showed greater occupational ambition); Marylee C. Taylor, White Backlash to
Workplace Affirmative Action: Peril or Myth?, 73 SOC. FORCES 1385 (1995) (finding that white
employees in affirmative action firms are more supportive of race-targeted remedies and
more likely to hold beliefs that justify intervention on behalf of minorities than white
employees in firms without affirmative action).
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 377 F.3d 949, 965 (9th
Cir. 2004) (“Grutter and Gratz shed much-needed light on the once crepuscular contours of
the narrow tailoring test applicable to the non-remedial use of racial preferences in
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Gratz.51 Even though Grutter’s holding largely undermines the decision’s
narrow-tailoring approach, judicial opinions and academic commentary are
taking the narrow-tailoring discussion on its own terms and privileging what
Grutter says over what Grutter does.
The opinion therefore contains an unsettled tension between diversity-asintegration and diversity-as-difference, and between employing the benchmark
of critical mass and relying on individualized consideration that eschews
numerical accountability. To build the case for resolving this tension in favor of
diversity-as-integration, I draw on Title VII law, which has long been skeptical
of subjective decisionmaking in the absence of numerical accountability.
II .

title vii’s critique of grutter

Grutter’s insistence on individualized consideration not only creates a
tension within the opinion, but also conflicts with the emphasis on objective
decisionmaking and numerical accountability that long has guided employers’
affirmative action plans under Title VII. Whereas Title VII cases express
skepticism about subjective decisionmaking processes, which can readily be
infected by bias, Grutter’s narrow-tailoring discussion lionizes Michigan Law
School’s flexible, individualized, and ultimately subjective evaluations as the
touchstone of constitutional affirmative action; and whereas Title VII cases rely
on numerical benchmarks to offer accountability, Grutter’s discussion
condemns any meaningful attention to the numbers. In short, Grutter’s
conception of narrow tailoring depends on the same unchecked subjective
decisionmaking that, according to Title VII doctrine, invites bias.
In this Part, I offer a Title VII critique of Grutter that suggests we resolve
the opinion’s internal tension in favor of diversity-as-integration over
diversity-as-difference. My claim is not that statutory and constitutional
standards for affirmative action must be identical, though several Justices
(including Justice O’Connor) and commentators have argued for a unified
standard.52 Rather, I argue only that statutory and constitutional standards for

51.
52.

educational admissions.”); Tilles, supra note 3, at 461 (“If the doctrinal development of
Grutter follows the same path as Bakke, we should expect to see a greater emphasis on
individualized determinations and decision making . . . .”); Turner, supra note 3, at 237
(warning not to “confuse the quantitative measurements common to remedial affirmative
action with diversity’s qualitative goals”).
Gratz accepted diversity as a compelling interest. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 268, 275
(2003).
See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 649 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“In my view, the proper initial inquiry in evaluating the legality of an affirmative action
plan by a public employer under Title VII is no different from that required by the Equal
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affirmative action are interrelated, and that Title VII law can help resolve
Grutter’s own contradictions. Doctrinal lines between the Equal Protection
Clause and Title VII, and between education and employment, have proven
porous in past affirmative action jurisprudence,53 and there is a longstanding
tradition of drawing on statutory law to inform constitutional affirmative
action law. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, a constitutional case involving
school teachers, looked to the foundational Title VII case United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber;54 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, a constitutional case about
broadcasting licenses, extensively invoked Weber’s progeny, Johnson v.
Transportation Agency;55 and, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., a
constitutional contracting set-aside case, Justice O’Connor imported Title VII’s
prima facie standard to govern the equal protection firm-basis test for remedial
affirmative action.56 So too, Title VII affirmative action cases have repeatedly
looked to constitutional principles; for example, Johnson drew on Wygant57 and
especially Bakke.58 It is therefore likely that Title VII guidelines will bear on
how courts interpret Grutter in future constitutional cases and that, in turn,
Grutter will influence Title VII doctrine.
Moreover, my critique of Grutter focuses less on doctrine than on the
opinion’s policy implications. Broadly speaking, affirmative action programs
under both Title VII and the Constitution seek to redress discrimination and
foster integration.59 Title VII cases, which have long grappled with integrative

53.
54.
55.
56.

57.
58.
59.

Protection Clause.”); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 290-91 (1986)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (same); Johnson, 480 U.S. at 665-66 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing for a unified, strict standard); George Rutherglen &
Daniel R. Ortiz, Affirmative Action Under the Constitution and Title VII: From Confusion to
Convergence, 35 UCLA L. REV. 467 (1988); Ronald W. Adelman, Note, Voluntary Affirmative
Action Plans by Public Employers: The Disparity in Standards Between Title VII and the Equal
Protection Clause, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 403 (1987).
See generally Estlund, supra note 3, at 13 (discussing the permeability of these doctrines).
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282 (plurality opinion) (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193 (1979)).
Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 596-97 (1990) (citing Johnson, 480 U.S. 616),
overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
488 U.S. 469, 500-02 (1989). Justice O’Connor discusses not only Title VII affirmative
action cases, but also traditional Title VII discrimination cases including International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), and Hazelwood School District v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). Croson, 488 U.S. at 500-02; see also id. at 542 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the relevance of Johnson, Weber, and Teamsters).
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626, 640; see also id. at 650-55 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 638; id. at 644 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Weber, 443 U.S. at 216 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 8.

1421

BULMAN-POZEN

the yale law journal

3/23/2006 6:58:51 PM

115:1408

2006

affirmative action plans, suggest that subjective decisionmaking facilitates
discrimination while numerical benchmarks cabin it, so these cases usefully
forecast both the promise of Grutter’s compelling-interest discussion and the
threat of the opinion’s narrow-tailoring discussion.
A. Affirmative Action Under Title VII
The Supreme Court has allowed private employers, whose practices are
governed only by Title VII, more freedom to implement affirmative action
programs than public employers, whose programs are governed by both Title
VII and the Equal Protection Clause.60 In its two cases considering voluntary
affirmative action under Title VII, the Court has used a remedial paradigm but
defined its borders generously: An employer may remedy the
underrepresentation of a particular group in a traditionally segregated job
category whether or not this underrepresentation is traceable to the employer’s
behavior.61 That is, the employer may act to integrate its workforce.
The 1979 case United Steelworkers of America v. Weber upheld a collectively
bargained plan that reserved half the openings in an in-plant craft training
program for African-Americans until the percentage of African-American
craftworkers in the facility approximated the percentage of African-Americans
in the local labor force. The Court did not require a showing of past
discrimination, but instead noted that the plan would “break down old
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy” and “eliminate a manifest racial
imbalance.”62
Similarly, in the 1987 case Johnson v. Transportation Agency,63 the Court
upheld an affirmative action plan designed to increase female representation
among skilled craftworkers in Santa Clara. When the plan was drafted, “none
of the 238 Skilled Craft Worker positions was held by a woman.”64 Noting that
sex served as a plus factor in the selection of a woman, Diane Joyce, over the

60.

61.

62.
63.
64.

See Croson, 488 U.S. at 491-92 (plurality opinion) (holding that, under the Constitution,
public employers may act only to remedy their own past discrimination, or discrimination
within their jurisdictions in which they have become “passive participant[s]”).
Johnson, 480 U.S. 616; Weber, 443 U.S. 193. The Court has also considered court-ordered
remedial affirmative action plans. E.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Local
28, Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 444-79 (1986) (plurality
opinion).
Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
Although the agency was a government employer, the Court considered only a Title VII
challenge.
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 621.
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plaintiff as a road dispatcher,65 the Court clarified what it had suggested in
Weber: To justify an affirmative action plan, a private employer “need not
point to its own prior discriminatory practices, nor even to evidence of an
arguable violation on its part. Rather, it need point only to a conspicuous . . .
imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories.”66 Although the record
showed repeated and ongoing discrimination against Joyce,67 this factual
predicate was not central to the Court’s holding. The Court demanded only
that there be a manifest imbalance—an imbalance less than that necessary to
support a prima facie case of discrimination against the employer.68 Instead of
insisting on a narrow compensatory role for affirmative action, Weber and
especially Johnson conceived of remediation in terms of integration.69
Considering effects more than purposes, the Court suggested that affirmative
action plans were permissible if they integrated traditionally segregated job
categories that remained imbalanced.70

65.

66.
67.
68.
69.

70.

Id. at 638. There is good reason to see Joyce’s selection not as a result of preference, but as
nondiscrimination—any plus factor she received simply combated the “minus” factors to
which she was subject as a woman. See infra note 67. Affirmative action plans often
compensate for present discrimination. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
306 n.43 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (noting that when race is considered to cure biases,
“it might be argued that there is no ‘preference’ at all”). Social psychologist Faye Crosby has
argued that affirmative action is superior to other means of combating discrimination
because it alone “does not rely on the aggrieved parties to come forward on their own
behalf. Relying on victims to advocate for themselves is not a good policy, as many factors
make it likely that victims will not speak up . . . .” Faye J. Crosby et al., Understanding
Affirmative Action, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 585, 592 (2006).
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 624 n.5.
Id. at 632.
This integrative paradigm was nonetheless consistent with remedial goals. For instance, the
Johnson majority suggested that women would be craft-workers but for some discrimination
that the agency had the power to correct. See id. at 634. But see id. at 668 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“It is a ‘traditionally segregated job category’ not
in the Weber sense, but in the sense that, because of longstanding social attitudes, it has not
been regarded by women themselves as desirable work.”). Scalia articulates the “lack of
interest” argument that Vicki Schultz has deconstructed. See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories
About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII
Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990).
See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630; see also id. at 642-46 (Stevens, J., concurring) (teasing out the
majority’s suggestion that integrative effects, rather than a backward-looking purpose,
would be the touchstone of acceptable affirmative action plans).
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B. Title VII’s Case for Integration
If Title VII cases anticipated Grutter’s attention to integration, their
insistence on objectivity and numerical accountability suggests Grutter should
be read to emphasize diversity-as-integration and critical mass, rather than
diversity-as-difference. Title VII doctrine underscores that the individualized
consideration Grutter’s narrow-tailoring analysis demands would be
counterproductive because it facilitates bias and stereotyping, threatens to reify
racial difference, and might ultimately reduce attention to racial diversity and
integration altogether.
1. Subjectivity and Numerical Accountability
In the past twenty-five years, social psychologists have shown that implicit
bias and stereotypical thinking reflect normal developmental processes:
Stereotypes are mechanisms all people use to process information about other
people, and, once in place, they bias judgment and decisionmaking, serving as
schemas or prototypes that influence how information is perceived,
interpreted, and remembered.71 Stereotypes about racial minorities are
particularly prevalent, especially among white Americans, who exhibit a strong
implicit bias against nonwhites.72 Thus, a white evaluator might perceive white
candidates as more thoughtful, charismatic, or articulate than AfricanAmerican candidates simply because of her preexisting biases.73 Aversive racism
theory, moreover, suggests that most people experience a conflict between their

71.

72.

73.

See, e.g., Kerry Kawakami et al., Automatic Stereotyping: Category, Trait, and Behavioral
Activations, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 3 (2002); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1187-88, 1199 (1995).
See, e.g., Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their
Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 147 (2004). Notably, racial minorities also
harbor stereotypes about their groups. See id. at 148-49 (“[F]or members of disadvantaged
social groups, implicit liking for the ingroup may sometimes be attenuated by the cultural
construal of their group, whereas for members of advantaged groups, implicit liking for the
ingroup my sometimes be exacerbated by the cultural construal of their group.”). For
empirical work showing that implicit biases and stereotypic beliefs produce discriminatory
judgments and behavior, see, for example, Allen R. McConnell & Jill M. Leibold, Relations
Among the Implicit Association Test, Discriminatory Behavior, and Explicit Measures of Racial
Attitudes, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 435 (2001); and Denise Sekaquaptewa et al.,
Stereotypic Explanatory Bias: Implicit Stereotyping as a Predictor of Discrimination, 39 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 75 (2003).
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN L. REV. 317, 343 (1987); see also Dasgupta, supra note 72, at 156.
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egalitarian value systems and the prejudice they harbor due to historically and
culturally racist contexts.74 As a result, they are most likely to discriminate
when there is another plausible explanation for their actions and
discrimination will not threaten their nonprejudiced self-image, such as when
an African-American candidate is marginally rather than obviously qualified.75
As many scholars and some courts have noted, psychological research on
bias and prejudice has significant consequences for conceptions of illegal
discrimination under Title VII.76 To “abolish traditional patterns of racial
segregation and hierarchy,”77 the law must guard not only against conscious
discrimination, but also unconscious discrimination. Social cognition theory
suggests that biases are most likely to infect outcomes when practices involve
unrestrained, subjective decisionmaking; and psychologists, sociologists, and
human-resource managers accordingly have argued for formalized, objective
personnel practices that constrain subjectivity in evaluations and decisions
about hiring, job assignments, and promotion.78
The Supreme Court first discussed the dangers of subjective employment
practices in the Title VII case Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust.79 Clara

74.
75.

76.

77.
78.

79.

See John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions: 1989 and
1999, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 315, 315 (2000).
Id. at 318 (finding in both 1989 and 1999 that self-described nonracist white study
participants made seemingly unbiased recommendations for obviously qualified AfricanAmerican candidates but evaluated marginally qualified African-American candidates much
more harshly than marginally qualified white candidates).
See, e.g., Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 58 (1st Cir. 1999); Tristin K. Green,
Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment
Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and
Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005); Krieger, supra note 71; Lawrence,
supra note 73; Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001).
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979).
See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Ass’n in Support of Respondent at
22-23, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (No. 87-1167); Stéphane Baldi &
Debra Branch McBrier, Do the Determinants of Promotion Differ for Blacks and Whites?
Evidence from the U.S. Labor Market, 24 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 478 (1997); William T.
Bielby, Minimizing Workplace Gender and Racial Bias, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 120, 127 (2000);
Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29 CONTEMP. SOC.
319, 325 (2000); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(4) (1975) (amended by 43 Fed. Reg. 38,295,
38, 312, Aug. 25, 1978) (“In view of the possibility of bias inherent in subjective evaluations,
supervisory rating techniques should be carefully developed, and the ratings should be
closely examined for evidence of bias.”).
487 U.S. 977 (1988). Earlier, in General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, the Court
noted that in an across-the-board class action, plaintiffs might allege that an employer had a
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Watson applied four times for supervisory positions at her bank and was
repeatedly overlooked. In making promotion decisions, the bank had no formal
criteria for evaluating candidates and instead relied on the “subjective
judgment of supervisors.”80 Noting both the potential for conscious
discriminatory intent and “the problem of subconscious stereotypes and
prejudices,”81 the Court analyzed this undisciplined subjective decisionmaking
system under Title VII’s disparate impact approach.82
Though decided as a disparate impact case, Watson might better have been
considered a disparate treatment case.83 The case hinged not on a neutral
criterion that had a disparate effect on minority candidates, but rather on a
process that engendered biased decisions; the evidence suggests that the bank’s
subjective decisionmaking system facilitated discrimination against Watson
based on her race. While the Watson Court used disparate impact analysis to
get at disparate treatment, the Court noted that it generally had “used
conventional disparate treatment theory . . . to review hiring and promotion
decisions that were based on the exercise of personal judgment or the
application of inherently subjective criteria.”84
Both disparate treatment and disparate impact lawsuits and personnel
practices designed to bring firms into compliance with Title VII have helped to
root out the discrimination that flourishes under subjective employment
systems and to force objective standards and accountability. Every federal
circuit court has recognized that subjective evaluations are particularly
susceptible to abuse and infection by bias.85 Several courts accept excessive
reliance on subjective criteria as evidence supporting an inference of

80.
81.
82.

83.
84.
85.

“general policy” of employing “entirely subjective decisionmaking processes.” 457 U.S. 147,
159 n.15 (1982).
Watson, 487 U.S. at 982.
Id. at 990.
Id. at 990-91 (“If an employer’s undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking has
precisely the same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional discrimination,
it is difficult to see why Title VII’s proscription against discriminatory actions should not
apply.”).
The district court had addressed Watson’s claims under a disparate treatment standard and
dismissed the action. See id. at 983; see also Green, supra note 76, at 141.
Watson, 487 U.S. at 988-89 (citing all of the Court’s significant disparate treatment cases to
date); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235-36 (1989).
See Hart, supra note 76, at 767 & n.132 (citing cases).
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discrimination,86 and, in the past two decades, courts have certified at least
twenty classes to challenge employer policies of subjective decisionmaking.87
Despite courts’ skepticism about the practice, subjective decisionmaking is
not prohibited under Title VII because it is not subjectivity per se that is
harmful, but rather subjectivity infected by bias, and numbers serve a key
evidentiary function: Courts can often gauge whether processes have been
infected by considering the representation of various groups in the
workforce.88 Title VII standards suggest that an effective way to recognize
potential disparate treatment is to compare the percentage of minorities in a
job to the percentage in the relevant labor market.89 Employers have leeway to
explain disparities, but explanations that courts might otherwise accept can fall

86.

87.

88.

89.

See, e.g., Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2002); McCullough
v. Real Foods, Inc., 140 F.3d 1123, 1129 (8th Cir. 1998); Roberts v. Gadsden Mem’l Hosp.,
835 F.2d 793, 798-99 (11th Cir. 1988).
Hart, supra note 76, at 787 & n.247 (citing cases); see also 1 BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 212 (3d ed. 1996). Nonetheless, courts have
been particularly deferential to employers’ subjective determinations in cases involving
white-collar jobs. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95
HARV. L. REV. 945 (1982); David Charny & G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency-Wages, Tournaments,
and Discrimination: A Theory of Employment Discrimination Law for “High-Level” Jobs, 33
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57 (1998).
See Green, supra note 76, at 141, 146; see also Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 586 (5th
Cir. 1962) (“In the problem of racial discrimination, statistics often tell much, and Courts
listen.”), aff’d, 371 U.S. 37 (1962).
For instance, plaintiffs can make out a prima facie case of systemic disparate treatment
through statistics showing a racial imbalance compared to the relevant labor market, see, e.g.,
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), and plaintiffs bolster their cases
of individual disparate treatment through strong statistical presentations, see, e.g.,
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Plaintiffs also most commonly
make out disparate impact cases by showing selection rates for any racial group that are less
than four-fifths the rate of the most successful group. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(d) (2005). See generally Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977) (“[A]bsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be
expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or
less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community
from which employees are hired.”). Although the Court has been more skeptical about the
evidentiary function of numerical comparisons in the equal protection context, it has
nonetheless drawn on Title VII cases to note the relevance of numerical imbalances to
constitutional claims. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509
(“Where there is a significant statistical disparity between the number of qualified minority
contractors willing and able to perform a particular service and the number of such
contractors actually engaged by the locality or the locality’s prime contractors, an inference
of discriminatory exclusion could arise.” (citing the foundational Title VII cases Bazemore v.
Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986), and International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324 (1977))); see also infra note 184 and accompanying text (discussing Croson).
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short if the employer has used a subjective decisionmaking process.90 Although
Title VII law is primarily concerned with fair processes, not outcomes,91
numerical outcomes help courts determine whether processes have been
influenced by bias.
Quantitative comparisons also serve a more immediate and internal
checking function. Numerical representation offers valuable feedback to
employers about whether their processes are fair or need adjustment. And
managers are most likely to police their own biases when they know they will
be held accountable for the outcomes of their decisions.92
In championing the use of both subjective criteria and a subjective
decisionmaking process, Grutter’s narrow-tailoring discussion departs from
Title VII guidelines. The opinion approvingly notes that the law school
considers applicants’ “potential to contribute to the learning of those around
them” and “to the well-being of others”93—two necessarily subjective
determinations. Further, as a recent commentary points out, “the criteria for
admission, including diversity, [a]re weighted subjectively, with no attempt to
quantify their importance.”94 Ample research suggests that both forms of

90.

91.

92.

93.

94.

See, e.g., Lujan v. Walters, 813 F.2d 1051, 1057 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting that the use of
subjective criteria can create a strong inference of discrimination “if there is a showing of
significant disparity in the representation of a particular group”). See generally 1 LINDEMANN
& GROSSMAN, supra note 87, at 209 (collecting cases).
Thus, a plaintiff’s prima facie disparate treatment case can be rebutted by a nonpretextual,
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the decision, see, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), and a prima facie disparate impact case can be
rebutted by a showing that the challenged practice is job related and consistent with
business necessity, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000). See generally Connecticut v.
Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (emphasizing the importance of fair processes over outcomes).
See, e.g., Bielby, supra note 78, at 123-26; Reskin, supra note 78, at 325; Barbara F. Reskin &
Debra Branch McBrier, Why Not Ascription? Organizations’ Employment of Male and Female
Managers, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 210, 227 (2000); cf. Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability: A Social
Check on the Fundamental Attribution Error, 48 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 227 (1985) (suggesting that
people express less bias when they know they will be accountable for their assessments).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 314-15 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
admissions policy seems to render even one’s diversity contribution a subjective criterion.
See id. at 316.
King & Hawpe, supra note 3, at 44.
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reliance on subjectivity—subjective criteria95 and subjective weighting of these
criteria for ultimate assessments96—may disadvantage minorities.
Yet this subjectivity goes unchecked in Grutter’s narrow-tailoring
discussion because the Court rejects not only rigid quotas, but also more
flexible forms of numerical accountability that might discipline such
subjectivity.97 Justice O’Connor significantly mutes the numerical basis of the
critical mass standard and emphasizes the lack of other quantitative
benchmarks. She relies, for example, on the fact that “the number of
underrepresented minority students who ultimately enroll in the Law School
differs substantially from their representation in the applicant pool and varies
considerably for each group from year to year,”98 and she notes that “[t]he Law
School frequently accepts nonminority applicants with grades and test scores
lower than underrepresented minority applicants . . . who are rejected.”99 In a
different context either of these statements would ring alarm bells: Why do the
application and acceptance numbers differ so substantially? Why are minority
applicants rejected when they perform well on two of the most objective
admissions criteria (grades and tests)?100 The anti-numbers emphasis of the
narrow-tailoring discussion seems to welcome bias into subjective
decisionmaking processes and undercut the opinion’s commitment to
meaningful integration.

95.

96.

97.
98.
99.
100.

See, e.g., Philip Moss & Chris Tilly, “Soft” Skills and Race: An Investigation of Black Men’s
Employment Problems, 23 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 252 (1996) (finding that employers viewed
black men as lacking in soft skills such as motivation and ability to interact well with
customers and coworkers).
See, e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 74 (finding that while study participants rated the
objective qualifications of blacks and whites equivalently, they were nonetheless
significantly more likely to recommend white candidates).
See infra Section II.C (describing such numerical accountability).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336.
Id. at 338.
Cf. Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 221, 248 n.121
(2004) (arguing that Grutter may create an incentive for schools “to reject highly qualified
minorities . . . to show that [they are] using highly individualized admissions standards”).
But see Lani Guinier, Comment, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of
Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 143-51 (2003) (challenging popular conceptions
of “objective” merit, including standardized test scores and grades); Daria Roithmayr,
Tacking Left: A Radical Critique of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 214-17 (2004) (same).
See generally DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE 145 (1987) (arguing that institutions continually renegotiate definitions of merit to
safeguard white racial status).

1429

BULMAN-POZEN

the yale law journal

3/23/2006 6:58:51 PM

115:1408

2006

2. Subjectivity and Affirmative Action
Of course, Grutter is an affirmative action case. Perhaps the opinion’s
emphasis on subjective decisionmaking and its rejection of numerical
accountability are unproblematic because an affirmative action plan itself
checks stereotyping and prejudice and helps, rather than harms, minority
applicants. Title VII doctrine is instructive about the importance of numbers to
affirmative action plans as well as traditional discrimination lawsuits, however,
and it highlights that without numerical accountability, subjectivity can cause
affirmative action plans to exaggerate racial difference and, ultimately, reduce
attention to racial diversity.101 Because these problems frustrate the goals of
affirmative action no matter the context, they are significant for education as
well as employment, and for public as well as private institutions. Title VII
doctrine therefore offers important lessons for affirmative action in the equal
protection context.
Courts have long reviewed employment affirmative action plans in light of
Teamsters’s assumption that workforces should approximate labor forces;102
when there is a stark imbalance, an employer can, and in some cases must,
implement a program to eliminate this vestige of discrimination and
segregation. Using numerical benchmarks based on local labor forces to guide
employment decisions and evaluate progress guarantees integration and
suggests that affirmative action is not a preference so much as a leveling of the
playing field.103 At the same time, numerical benchmarks ensure that
employers grant “only those minority preferences necessary to further the
plans’ purpose.”104
It is Grutter’s ostensible rejection of quantitative measures that can
constrain subjectivity, more than its embrace of subjective decisionmaking per
se, that particularly distinguishes it from Title VII affirmative action cases. The
promotion decision at stake in Johnson, for instance, was in some ways
subjective,105 but the affirmative action plan used numerical goals and

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See infra notes 114-121 and accompanying text.
See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977).
Cf. Spann, supra note 49, at 655-56 (arguing that nondiscrimination should lead to racial
balance).
Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1564 (3d Cir. 1996).
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 625 (1987) (quoting the director of defendant
Transportation Agency as stating that he “‘tried to look at the whole picture, the
combination of [Ms. Joyce’s] qualifications and Mr. Johnson’s qualifications, their test
scores, their expertise, their background, affirmative action matters, things like that’”); id. at
641 n.17 (citing the “‘standard tenet of personnel administration’” that “‘final
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timetables to constrain subjectivity and eliminate bias from employment
decisions as much as possible.106 As Joyce’s case made clear, the agency’s
numerical benchmarking served as a check on a subjective system that was
likely to disadvantage women and minorities. Thus, while the Court insisted
that the county’s plan was not intended to establish a work force “whose
permanent composition is dictated by rigid numerical standards,”107 an
appreciation of the value of numerical benchmarks undergirds the entire
decision.
By contrast, the absence of numerical accountability helps explain the
holding in Taxman v. Board of Education,108 which rejected a school board’s
affirmative action plan preferring minority teachers over equally qualified
nonminority teachers in layoff decisions. The court held that Title VII
proscribes diversity-based affirmative action plans because nonremedial
purposes do not mirror the purposes of the statute,109 but the opinion
evidenced particular concern with the plan’s lack of numerical basis. There was
no racial imbalance to remedy because the percentage of African-American
employees in the job category that included teachers exceeded the percentage of
African-Americans in the available workforce.110 As a consequence, the school
policy was “devoid of goals and standards, [and was] governed entirely by the
Board’s whim.”111
As Taxman suggests, the lack of a numerical check exacerbates problems of
subjectivity. One might argue that affirmative action systems like those at stake
in Taxman and Grutter use subjectivity to privilege, rather than discriminate
against, minority applicants, and that such subjectivity is not problematic
because it counterbalances discrimination. A subjective evaluation system
might even provide an extra boost to minority candidates if decisionmakers use

106.
107.
108.

109.
110.
111.

determinations as to which candidate is “best qualified” are at best subjective.’” (quoting
Brief for American Society for Personnel Administration as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Johnson, 480 U.S. 616 (No. 85-1129), 1986 WL 728160)).
Id. at 621-22; see infra note 187 (discussing the plan’s numerical benchmarks).
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 641.
91 F.3d 1547. Taxman was the most important circuit case to consider nonremedial
affirmative action prior to Grutter. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but civil rights
groups intervened to settle the case prior to oral arguments and certiorari was dismissed. 522
U.S. 1010 (1997) (mem.); see Ronald Roach, Bailing Out Piscataway School Board: Civil
Rights Groups Avoid Possibility of Allowing Supreme Court To Make “Bad Law,” BLACK ISSUES
HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 11, 1997, at 12.
Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1557.
Id. at 1551, 1563.
Id. at 1564.
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it to “create ‘leeway’ in promoting minorities.”112 Of course, such leeway is
itself problematic for those who fear employers and universities will select
minorities at whim and “trammel the interests of” white applicants in the
absence of strict numerical goals.113
Even one who dismisses the possibility of minority overrepresentation,
however, should worry about unchecked subjectivity’s effects on racial
integration. First, subjective decisionmaking threatens to reify culture-race,114
rather than to deconstruct it, as Grutter’s diversity-as-integration rationale
urges. Once decisionmakers are free to evaluate diversity contributions
subjectively, they are likely to speculate about what perspectives and
experiences racial identity signifies. Thus, an admissions committee may look
for minority students who, in its eyes, particularly embody the AfricanAmerican experience, or, on the contrary, seem to have different viewpoints
from other minority students.115 Race may therefore function as a plus factor
for one applicant, but not for an equally qualified applicant. The underlying
assumption of Grutter’s diversity-as-integration rationale, however, is that
simply by being a racial minority one contributes to diversity, and, by being
part of a critical mass, one helps to break down stereotypes and foster
meaningful integration.
Moreover, even if admissions committees intend for affirmative action
plans to check discrimination against minority applicants, only numerical
goals, however loosely defined, can control decisionmakers’ unconscious
prejudices and guard against minority underrepresentation. As psychological
studies demonstrate, people often are not aware that they are discriminating;
they believe that their bias-infused judgments are based on criteria other than
race, and that the “minimally qualified underrepresented minority
applicant[s]” Gratz disparages116 are the most likely targets of such aversive
racism.117 The simple fact of an affirmative action plan therefore may not

112.
113.
114.

115.

116.
117.

Bass v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 256 F.3d 1095, 1107 (11th Cir. 2001).
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1991)
(setting forth a taxonomy of “status-race, formal-race, historical-race, and culture-race”); see
also FORD, supra note 44.
But cf. Samuel Issacharoff, Can Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 669, 678
(1998) (“Justice Powell’s [Bakke] opinion reads as if . . . institutional actors could reconsider
each file against the entire pool so as to make incremental judgments about a particular
applicant’s contribution to the overall objective of diversity. . . . [N]o competitive
admissions system could be guided by this imprecise a course of action.”).
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 272 (2003).
See, e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 74, at 318.
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counter discrimination, for the minority applicants in need of affirmative
action—those who are marginally, not highly qualified—are likely to be
perceived as significantly less qualified than their white peers.118 An affirmative
action program without benchmarks might even exacerbate minority
underrepresentation by making institutions less vigilant.119
Given the dangers of undisciplined subjectivity, the best way to determine
whether an affirmative action plan furthers the goal of diversity-as-integration
is to look at how the plan is implemented, paying special attention to minority
representation throughout an institution. For remedial plans under Title VII,
courts look first to the manifest imbalance120—that is, they look to the numbers
to determine whether affirmative action is warranted. Because diversity-based
affirmative action that fosters integration has remedial effects, broadly defined,
numerical representation should be a crucial data point.121 It is the primacy of
this sort of measure that Grutter’s discussion of critical mass champions but
that its narrow-tailoring analysis precludes.
C. Reading Grutter Through the Lens of Title VII
Title VII doctrine not only highlights the shortcomings of Grutter’s
narrow-tailoring analysis but also offers a productive framework for
interpreting the decision, at once suggesting that it is critical mass rather than
individualized consideration that will best further the compelling interest in
integration and fleshing out the concept of critical mass with its own manifest
imbalance standard. Justice O’Connor’s narrow-tailoring discussion treats
critical mass as a qualitative concept, but Title VII suggests that a quantitative
conception of critical mass is necessary to realizing the opinion’s goals. While
institutions can foster diversity-as-difference with no more than “‘[s]ome

118.

119.

120.

121.

See id. The unconscious racial bias and stereotyping underlying such evaluations will only be
significantly reduced in response to more racially representative institutions; it is not
nonracist attitudes that will reshape institutions, but rather representative institutions that
will reshape attitudes. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Psychological Association in
Support of Respondents at 13, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), Gratz,
539 U.S. 244 (No. 02-516).
Cf. Bielby, supra note 78, at 125 (“[A] company’s EEO efforts to advance minorities and
women through the organization [often] contain more symbol than substance . . . .”);
Edelman, Symbolic Structures, supra note 9, at 1542 (same).
E.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 631-33 (1987) (defining manifest imbalance
as a conspicuous difference between an employer’s workforce demographics and the
demographics of the general population or local labor market).
See Yelnosky, supra note 34.
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attention to numbers,’”122 diversity-as-integration requires more: careful
scrutiny of the numbers to ensure a population of minority students large
enough to facilitate their well-being and representation within the institution
and to reduce the discrimination that arises when minorities are tokens.123
If critical mass is a quantitative measure, however, no single number
defines the concept, and social science research suggests guidelines ranging
from fifteen to thirty-five percent minority representation.124 Notably, most
research on tokenism and critical mass has focused on women, and race may
present a more complicated case.125 First, there is reason to believe that critical
mass turns on the representation of both specific racial minorities and
underrepresented racial minorities generally—a live debate in Grutter126—
because both tokens and dominants (members of the majority group who
control an institution’s culture) are relevant. Female tokens and male
dominants are inversely related, but race is not similarly binary. So while
attention to the representation of each minority group remains important,
universities should also consider the total percentage of minority students: A
higher percentage will lessen white dominance and should also reduce
discrimination, as psychological research suggests in-group favoritism may be
a stronger source of discrimination than out-group devaluation.127

122.
123.
124.

125.
126.

127.

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323
(1978) (appendix to opinion of Powell, J.)).
See, e.g., KANTER, supra note 33, at 206-42; Yelnosky, supra note 34, at 1389-99.
Rosabeth Moss Kanter introduced the concepts of critical mass and tokens in her study of
women working in a large corporation. She hypothesized that numbers affect organizational
outcomes and argued that representation of less than fifteen percent creates “skewed
groups” in which minorities are tokens; “tilted groups” have somewhat more equal
distribution; and “balanced groups” include forty to fifty percent minority members.
KANTER, supra note 33, at 208-09. Subsequent studies have refined but largely confirmed
Kanter’s hypothesis. See Yelnosky, supra note 34, at 1391-92 & n.17; see also Brief for Amicus
Curiae American Psychological Ass’n in Support of Respondent at 20, Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (No. 87-1167) (suggesting a guideline of fifteen percent);
Martha Chamallas, The New Gender Panic: Reflections on Sex Scandals and the Military, 83
MINN. L. REV. 305, 324 (1998) (suggesting a guideline of twenty-five percent).
See Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII: Some
Contemporary Influences, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2370, 2379 (1994).
Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 375 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Thus, the Law School may not
discriminate in admissions between similarly situated blacks and Hispanics, or between
whites and Asians.”), with id. at 380-81 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he Law School
seeks to accumulate a ‘critical mass’ of each underrepresented minority group.”).
See, e.g., Dasgupta, supra note 72, at 146-47; John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, On the
Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: The Causes, Consequences, and Challenges of Aversive Racism,
in CONFRONTING RACISM: THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE 3, 25-28 (Jennifer L. Eberhardt
& Susan T. Fiske eds., 1998); Clark Freshman, Whatever Happened to Anti-Semitism? How

1434

BULMAN-POZEN

3/23/2006 6:58:51 PM

grutter at work

Moreover, given that underrepresented racial minorities are likely to
remain skewed or tilted groups128 even in the aggregate,129 universities must
remain vigilant about discrimination after they have implemented affirmative
action plans. Here the Title VII literature is again instructive, for it stresses that
power matters as well as numbers,130 and employers must monitor minorities’
well-being and progress within institutional hierarchies, not only hiring
rates.131 So too, a university must not stop its diversity-as-integration project
with admissions decisions, but must strive to facilitate meaningful integration
throughout the campus.
Reading Grutter through the lens of Title VII doctrine not only highlights
the importance of critical mass to integration, but also offers a complementary
standard for universities to consider—Title VII’s notion of manifest imbalance.
The close connection between integration and the manifest imbalance
guideline Title VII case law stresses132 suggests that universities striving for
integration should consider not only critical mass, an intra-institutional figure,
but also the broader population and applicant figures that ground the manifest
imbalance standard.
Michigan Law School seemed to do just this, as Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
Grutter dissent underscores. Rehnquist questions why critical mass involves
different benchmarks for different racial groups and argues that these disparate
numbers reveal racial balancing for its own sake.133 As the concept of manifest
imbalance suggests, however, affirmative action plans aimed at integration
must consider population dynamics to ensure participation by racial minorities
and to signal that institutions are open to all. The very notions of

128.
129.

130.

131.

132.
133.

Social Science Theories Identify Discrimination and Promote Coalitions Between “Different”
Minorities, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 322-26, 352, 410-26 (2000).
See supra note 124 for a discussion of these terms.
For example, Michigan Law School averaged roughly fifteen percent total African-American,
Hispanic, and Native-American student representation between 1987 and 1998. See Grutter,
539 U.S. at 389-90.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Chambliss & Christopher Uggen, Men and Women of Elite Law Firms:
Reevaluating Kanter’s Legacy, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 41 (2000); Janice D. Yoder, Looking
Beyond Numbers: The Effects of Gender Status, Job Prestige, and Occupational Gender-Typing on
Tokenism Processes, 57 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 150 (1994); Lynn Zimmer, Tokenism and Women in
the Workplace: The Limits of Gender-Neutral Theory, 35 SOC. PROBS. 64 (1988).
See, e.g., Bielby, supra note 78, at 122-25; Lisa M. Lynch & Sandra E. Black, Beyond the
Incidence of Employer-Provided Training, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 64 (1998) (discussing
the importance of formal training for workplace advancement); Reskin & McBrier, supra
note 92, at 214.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 631-36 (1987); Estlund, supra note 3, at
37 (noting that critical mass and manifest imbalance are complementary concepts).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 381-86 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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representation and legitimacy Grutter emphasizes demand that elite institutions
such as universities at least loosely resemble society at large.134 To render “the
path to leadership . . . visibly open,” in the eyes of society, “to talented and
qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity,”135 and to encourage
minorities to develop the human capital necessary to enter such institutions,
minorities must be present not only in numbers that ensure they do not feel
like tokens within the institution, but also in numbers that reflect their
presence in the wider population.136 Together, critical mass and manifest
imbalance offer institutions striving for integration a set of numerical goals
around which to build voluntary affirmative action plans.137
In sum, reading Grutter through the lens of Title VII supports Grutter’s
diversity-as-integration rationale, not its competing diversity-as-difference
discussion of narrow tailoring. In the following Part, I explore the
consequences of this choice for Title VII.
iii. consequences for title vii
Much as Title VII doctrine can guide interpretations of Grutter, so too can
Grutter productively inform Title VII doctrine. The Court has not considered a
private employer’s affirmative action plan since 1987, and in the past two
decades, both lower court decisions and Supreme Court dicta have chipped
away at readings of Johnson that championed an integrative, rather than strictly
remedial rationale for affirmative action.138 As many scholars have noted,

134.

135.
136.

137.

138.

See Estlund, supra note 3, at 37; cf. Anderson, supra note 18, at 32 (arguing that the
differential representation of each disadvantaged group “is tied to the urgency of each
group’s need for integration—that is, the degree of severity of the segregation they suffer”).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.
Cf. Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 18-27, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003) (No. 02-516) (describing the military’s race-conscious selection methods, including
percentage goals for minorities based on their representation in the population).
A constitutional affirmative action case decided in the wake of Grutter points to this synergy
between inward-looking critical mass and outward-looking manifest imbalance standards.
See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2005) (upholding under Grutter a
school district transfer plan calibrated around district demographics rather than a strict
approximation of critical mass for each school).
See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(noting that affirmative action plans must be “strictly reserved for remedial settings”);
Schurr v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 196 F.3d 486, 497 (3d Cir. 1999); Taxman v. Bd. of
Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1557-58 (3d Cir. 1996).
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Grutter’s diversity rationale is likely to reshape Title VII law.139 The opinion’s
characterization of this compelling interest as diversity-as-integration might
lend new support to integrative readings of Johnson. But Grutter’s narrowtailoring discussion, which limits the operation of diversity-as-integration and
champions diversity-as-difference, might migrate as well, threatening ideals of
objectivity and numerical accountability central to employment affirmative
action law.
A. Grutter’s Migration
Grutter is almost certain to transform employment affirmative action law.140
A strong case can be made for limiting the decision to university admissions:
Grutter emphasizes the distinctive context of higher education and the
particular deference the Court gives to academic decisions,141 and universities
have a unique claim to create positive externalities. But compelling reasons
both internal and external to Grutter suggest that the decision’s embrace of
diversity and renewed support for affirmative action are likely to migrate:
Doctrinal boundaries have been permeable in the Court’s prior affirmative
action jurisprudence; Grutter’s holding is linked to broad social goals rather
than specific educational outcomes; and the Court relies on businesses’ amicus
briefs to shape its constitutional commitments.
As I have noted, boundaries between statutory and constitutional standards
and employment and educational contexts have been porous in the Court’s
affirmative action jurisprudence.142 The clearest analogue for Grutter is Bakke,
which “became the logical foundation to the development of the Supreme
Court’s approach to affirmative action in employment” in both the
constitutional and Title VII contexts.143 Grutter’s diversity rationale has already
begun to travel beyond higher education to elementary and high school
education,144 and it need not be so bounded. While Grutter makes much of the
special deference the Court has traditionally awarded university academic

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

144.

See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 3, at 4-5; Foreman et al., supra note 3, at 83-84; Tilles, supra
note 3, at 463; Turner, supra note 3, at 237; White, supra note 3, at 264, 275.
See supra note 139.
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-29.
See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
Tilles, supra note 3, at 454; see, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 216
(1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987);
id. at 643-44 (Stevens, J., concurring).
See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch.
v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 377 F.3d 949, 962-64 (9th Cir. 2004).
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decisions, for instance, the Court has also shown considerable deference to
employer prerogatives in both statutory and constitutional contexts.145
A stronger reason for predicting Grutter’s migration is one internal to the
decision. Because Grutter focuses on broad societal goals and not only
pedagogical benefits, its holding is not closely tethered to educational
institutions. The Court’s emphasis on Michigan Law School’s instrumental
role in facilitating widespread participation in civic life146 suggests that each
institution that serves as a forum for civic participation has a compelling
interest in including members of all racial and ethnic groups.147 This is a source
of much consternation to Justice Scalia, who argues that the Court’s rationale
could justify affirmative action by Michigan’s civil service system and even
private employers.148 Despite his sarcastic tone, there is reason to believe
Scalia’s parade of horribles, for the Court’s logic cannot be contained within
university gates. Michigan’s civil service system and private employers are in a
position to foster the societal integration that lies at the heart of Grutter. As
Cynthia Estlund has argued, integrated workplaces may “build interpersonal
bonds, combat[] stereotypes, and promote[] understanding” more effectively
than integrated college campuses, and produce similar “positive civic spillover
for the whole society.”149
Further, Grutter itself relies on the amicus briefs of major American
businesses. While these briefs support affirmative action in education, not in
employment per se, their language suggests they are laying the groundwork to
justify workplace affirmative action. For instance, the brief of sixty-five major
American businesses refers not simply to the importance of “individuals who
have been educated in a diverse setting,” but, in the same breath, to the
importance within the workplace of “a diverse group of individuals” and “a

145.
146.
147.
148.

149.

White, supra note 3, at 270-71.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-32.
Post, supra note 24, at 61.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“If it is
appropriate for the University of Michigan Law School to use racial discrimination for the
purpose of putting together a ‘critical mass’ that will convey generic lessons in socialization
and good citizenship, surely it is no less appropriate—indeed, particularly appropriate—for
the civil service system of the State of Michigan to do so. There, also, those exposed to
‘critical masses’ of certain races will presumably become better Americans, better
Michiganders, better civil servants. And surely private employers cannot be criticized—
indeed, should be praised—if they also ‘teach’ good citizenship to their adult employees
through a patriotic, all-American system of racial discrimination in hiring.”).
Estlund, supra note 3, at 24-25. In an earlier article, Estlund made the broader case that
workplace integration is salutary for the democratic project. Estlund, supra note 7, at 77.
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racially diverse group of managers.”150 One might argue that if universities
have affirmative action programs, businesses will not need their own,151 and
this is certainly a hope of Grutter. But this vision does not recognize that most
American workers, particularly minorities, have not graduated from college, let
alone professional or graduate school.152 University affirmative action programs
can help combat the effects of discrimination and segregation, but they are not
enough, at least in the twenty-five-year window Grutter provides,153 to ensure
workplace integration.
Regardless of whether the businesses’ briefs support a compelling interest
in educational diversity or employment diversity, what is more important is
that the Court is looking to private businesses to help it define constitutional
commitments. Neither equal protection nor Title VII doctrine is independent
from the values of nonjudicial actors.154 Grutter interprets the Equal Protection
Clause in light of the beliefs of major American companies, and this suggests
courts might interpret Title VII in light of these same beliefs and legitimate
diversity-oriented affirmative action plans in the employment context as well.

150.

151.

152.

153.
154.

Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses in Support of Respondents at 7,
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516); see
also Brief of General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 24,
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (No. 02-516) (“[H]eterogeneous
work teams create better and more innovative products and ideas than homogenous
teams.”).
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke’s Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1749
(1996) (“Higher education, by making up for educational inequities at early stages in life,
can be the ramp up to a level playing field—with no further affirmative action—for the rest
of one’s future.”).
Roughly one-third of white Americans graduate from college, and the numbers are
significantly lower for African-Americans (17.6%) and Hispanics (12.1%). Press
Release,
U.S. Census Bureau, College Degree Nearly Doubles Annual Earnings, Census Bureau
Reports (Mar. 28, 2005), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/
archives/education/004214.html. One might further argue that jobs that do not require a
college education also should not need affirmative action programs to compensate for
minorities’ lack of qualifications, but the “soft skills” that often determine hiring for such
lower-level jobs are especially likely bases for racial discrimination. See Moss & Tilly, supra
note 95.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
See Edelman, Symbolic Structures, supra note 9 (Title VII); Post, supra note 24, at 8
(Constitution).
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B. The Threat
Courts’ attention to business demands for diversity need not lead to
integrative affirmative action, however. At its best, “the business case for
diversity”155 emphasizes values of participation and legitimacy and champions
integration.156 But in its more limited articulation, the business case for
diversity departs from Grutter’s diversity-as-integration conception: Firms
focus on organizational survival and profit, not civil rights commitments,157
and their rhetoric suggests that they value difference of viewpoint, knowledge,
and appearance above meaningful integration.158 It is therefore possible that if
Grutter migrates to the workplace, employers will implement affirmative action
programs based on a view of diversity-as-difference.
This threat is all the more plausible if Grutter’s narrow-tailoring discussion
migrates at the expense of its diversity-as-integration rationale and emphasis
on critical mass—a real possibility, given the attention that courts and
commentators are paying to the narrow-tailoring prong.159 Relying on
individualized determinations, to the exclusion of numerical accountability,
threatens affirmative action’s success in the employment context even more
than in the educational context. While university admissions officers make
nuanced calculations for all applicants and lose authority over students once
they are admitted, employers retain control over employees’ responsibilities
and advancement in the workplace. Allowing employers to use subjective
assessments and disregard numerical benchmarks both to compose and to
organize their workforces fosters a view of diversity-as-difference that limits
employment opportunities by race.
First, a diversity-as-difference approach may lead employers to pigeonhole
and segregate employees to capitalize on their diversity contributions. To

155.

156.

157.
158.
159.

E.g., David B. Wilkins, From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is Good for
Business”: The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1556 (2004). See generally Edelman, Diversity Rhetoric, supra note 9
(discussing this instrumental form of affirmative action); Estlund, supra note 3, at 4 (same);
Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action: Law and the
New Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677 (2004) (same).
David A. Thomas & Robin J. Ely, Making Differences Matter: A New Paradigm for Managing
Diversity, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 79, 86 (“The emerging paradigm . . .
organizes itself around the overarching theme of integration. Assimilation goes too far in
pursuing sameness. Differentiation, as we have shown, overshoots in the other direction.”).
Edelman, Diversity Rhetoric, supra note 9, at 1618-21.
See Thomas & Ely, supra note 156, at 83-85.
See supra note 50.
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exploit the “black market”160 or the “Latino market,” employers often assign
minority employees to serve minority communities. Seventy percent of retailers
surveyed in a recent study admit to race-matching for their clients,161 and the
practice is also common at law firms.162 Such race-matching not only evokes
discredited customer preference arguments that long limited minorities’
opportunities,163 but also generates new obstacles to integration. Though racematching may increase minorities’ chances of being hired, so too does it
increase racial segregation within firms,164 suggest that minorities’ skill sets are
relevant only to particular niches,165 and justify assigning minorities to poorer
segments of the market.166 Employers may also give minorities particular
assignments that limit their chances for institutional mobility or even place
them in greater danger than their white colleagues. Several equal protection
cases considering race- and ethnicity-based assignments167 suggest the fluid
connection between evaluating individuals’ diversity contributions as a matter
of difference and funneling them into jobs that capitalize on these diversity
contributions and hinder their advancement.168 Relying on the individualized,
subjective evaluation systems that Grutter endorses may exacerbate this
problem because white employees are frequently promoted based on subjective

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

165.

166.
167.

168.

See Eric Grodsky & Devah Pager, The Structure of Disadvantage: Individual and Occupational
Determinants of the Black-White Wage Gap, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 542, 561 (2001).
Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 155, at 712-13.
See Elizabeth Chambliss, Organizational Determinants of Law Firm Integration, 46 AM. U. L.
REV. 669, 742-43 (1997); Wilkins, supra note 155, at 1594-97.
Estlund, supra note 3, at 23 (discussing remarks by Deborah Malamud).
See Chambliss, supra note 162, at 743 (“The identification of minority lawyers with minority
clients may itself become problematic, however, by increasing ethnic segmentation within
the firms.”).
See, e.g., Thomas & Ely, supra note 156, at 84 (“Many organizations . . . have diversified only
in those areas in which they interact with particular niche-market segments. In time, many
individuals recruited for this function have come to feel devalued and used as they begin to
sense that opportunities in other parts of the organization are closed to them.”).
See, e.g., Grodsky & Pager, supra note 160, at 561. See generally Frymer & Skrentny, supra
note 155 (discussing the harms of instrumental affirmative action).
In Perez v. FBI, Latino officers complained of being segregated into Spanish-speaking jobs
that led to fewer promotions. 707 F. Supp. 891 (W.D. Tex. 1988), aff’d 956 F.2d 265 (5th
Cir. 1992). In Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n v. City of New York, 74 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y.
1999), and Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Delmonte, 553 F. Supp. 601 (D. Conn. 1983), AfricanAmerican police officers claimed they suffered a loss of status and were placed in difficult
and dangerous high-crime areas due to their race.
See Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 155. When race is used in these instrumental ways, it
begins to look like a BFOQ, and Title VII explicitly does not include a race BFOQ. See supra
note 6.
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assessments, while African-Americans tend to be promoted based on formal,
objective criteria.169
Without numerical accountability, subjective assessments of diversity may
even lead employers to overlook or mute the importance of racial diversity
altogether. In addition to race and sex, the managerial literature emphasizes
diverse attitudes, work styles, and communication skills, and even chattiness
versus quietness.170 If employers understand affirmative action as a quest for
diversity “pursued and measured independently of race,”171 they may cease to
attend to racial integration, thus undermining goals of affirmative action and
antidiscrimination law more generally, given that voluntary affirmative action
is a means of staving off discrimination lawsuits.172 Finally, to the extent
employers rely on diversity-as-difference arguments and correlate race with
other privileged attributes, they invite the “lack of interest” argument that
certain racial minorities are not interested in particular jobs, no matter how
high-paying, geographically convenient, or prestigious.173
C. Making Grutter Work
While this specter of Grutter’s narrow-tailoring discussion hangs over
workplace affirmative action, the opinion’s compelling interest in diversity-asintegration instead points to an expansive vision of Title VII doctrine. Grutter
returns the spotlight to Title VII’s broad view of remediation, which prioritizes
integration over compensation, and also suggests possibilities for employment
discrimination law’s future development. First, Grutter’s diversity-asintegration rationale seems to confirm that, under Title VII, employers may use
affirmative action not only to redress their own past discrimination, but also to
rectify workforce imbalances. The opinion similarly portends that employers
might look to general labor market figures to determine whether there is an

169.

170.
171.
172.
173.

See Baldi & McBrier, supra note 78, at 492-93; George Wilson et al., Reaching the Top: Racial
Differences in Mobility Paths to Upper-Tier Occupations, 26 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 165, 179-80
(1999); see also Bielby, supra note 78, at 123; Reskin & McBrier, supra note 92, at 214, 226-27.
Edelman, Diversity Rhetoric, supra note 9, at 1616.
King & Hawpe, supra note 3, at 55.
See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209-11 (1979) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); Edelman, Diversity Rhetoric, supra note 9.
Cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 503 (1989) (discussing “black and
white career and entrepreneurial choices” and noting that “[b]lacks may be
disproportionately attracted to industries other than construction”). See generally Vicki
Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack
of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 112627 (1992) (discussing the lack-of-interest argument).
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actionable imbalance—a more generous comparator than the already-qualified
labor market. Finally, following Grutter’s attention to critical mass, leadership,
and legitimacy, employers might use affirmative action not only to hire a few
minority candidates, but also to construct a meaningfully integrated workforce.
Grutter’s diversity-as-integration interest offers employers a diversity
rationale that builds on, rather than departs from, past Title VII case law.
Although Johnson suggested employers might rectify an unbalanced workforce
without pointing to their own prior discriminatory practices, it nonetheless
hewed to the remedial rationale. Grutter brings the diversity rationale in line
with remedial objectives by emphasizing integration.
More specifically, Grutter provides support for unit-level responses to
societal problems of segregation and hierarchy. Today, racial minorities remain
significantly disadvantaged in labor markets,174 and both businesses and jobs
are racially segregated.175 Such lingering, self-perpetuating segregation cannot
be traced to any single source,176 and traditionally the Court has proscribed
government affirmative action plans responding to societal discrimination,
which it views as “too amorphous a basis” for remediation.177 But Grutter
recognizes that schools, businesses, housing markets, government bodies, and
other civic institutions are linked, and each can compound or help eliminate
discrimination and segregation. Casting these institutions as connected pieces
of a larger whole, the opinion focuses, in the words of one scholar, “on the
condition of society and what affirmative action can do to help fix it, not what
caused the condition.”178 Grutter suggests that any institution in a position to
further integration may act. Title VII has always been more accommodating of
affirmative action than the Equal Protection Clause, however, and in this
respect Grutter’s holding would simply support the generous reading of

174.

175.

176.
177.
178.

See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9873, 2003); see also William A. Darity Jr. & Patrick L.
Mason, Evidence on Discrimination in Employment: Codes of Color, Codes of Gender, 12 J. ECON.
PERSP. 63, 70-81 (1998); Foreman et al., supra note 3, at 84-89; Kathryn M. Neckerman &
Joleen Kirschenman, Hiring Strategies, Racial Bias, and Inner-City Workers, 38 SOC. PROBS.
433 (1991).
For instance, roughly sixty percent of white-owned firms in metropolitan areas where
minorities live have no minority employees, while almost ninety percent of AfricanAmerican-owned firms have workforces that are at least seventy-five percent minority.
Anderson, supra note 8, at 1200.
See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 18, at 16-17; Shelly Lundberg & Richard Startz, On the
Persistence of Racial Inequality, 16 J. LAB. ECON. 292 (1998).
E.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion).
Greenberg, supra note 31, at 1621.

1443

BULMAN-POZEN

the yale law journal

3/23/2006 6:58:51 PM

115:1408

2006

Johnson: An employer integrating a conspicuously imbalanced job
presumptively acts within the scope of Title VII.179
Still, Johnson was a stark case. There was not a single female skilled
craftworker—the “inexorable zero” that always catches the Court’s eye180—so
the Court never articulated how substantially the manifest imbalance standard
departed from a suggestion of past discrimination.181 The opinion therefore left
two interrelated questions unanswered: What constitutes a manifest imbalance
and how far may an employer go to rectify it? Grutter suggests answers to
both: General labor market figures, and not only the already-qualified market,
may be the relevant comparator; and employers may use affirmative action
plans to attain a critical mass of minorities and meaningfully integrate the
workforce.
Given Title VII’s emphasis on numerical accountability, employers and
courts have long wrangled over the proper labor market to serve as a
comparator. For skilled jobs, courts have generally used the qualified labor
market, rather than the more generous total area labor market.182 But this may
simply replicate patterns of segregation, for discrimination can infect the labor
market numbers being used as a neutral comparator. Thus, Weber used the
entire area labor market as its baseline because, as the Court later recalled in
Johnson,
the proportion of black craft workers in the local labor force was likely
as miniscule as the proportion in Kaiser’s work force. The Court
realized that the lack of imbalance between these figures would mean
that employers in precisely those industries in which discrimination has
been most effective would be precluded from adopting training
programs to increase the percentage of qualified minorities.183
Croson, however, imported Title VII’s reliance on the relevant labor market
into the equal protection context but insisted that only the qualified labor pool
was relevant. It chastised the City of Richmond for using a figure that rested
“upon the completely unrealistic assumption that minorities will choose a

179.
180.
181.

182.
183.

See Estlund, supra note 3, at 36.
See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23 (1977).
Justice O’Connor’s Johnson concurrence argued that the numbers were strong enough to
make out a prima facie case against the county. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616,
656 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
See BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 811 &
n.122 (3d ed. Supp. 2002) (collecting cases).
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 633 n.10.
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particular trade in lockstep proportion to their representation in the local
population.”184
Johnson suggested that the difference between using qualified local labor
market figures and total local labor market figures might be the difference
between the Constitution’s prima facie case standard and Title VII’s more
generous manifest imbalance standard,185 but the Johnson Court was equivocal
on this point. While the Court noted that in cases like Weber, which involved
the selection of unskilled workers, the standard permitted comparison with the
general labor force,186 it repeated that for jobs demanding special training, the
comparison should be only with the qualified labor force.187
Grutter suggests that the general area labor market, and not only the
qualified labor pool, is a permissible comparator for voluntary affirmative
action plans. The opinion’s emphasis on participatory values implies that
integration aimed at making institutions resemble local populations is a worthy
goal.188 Moreover, the choice of the relevant labor market reflects assumptions
about the interests and aptitudes of various minority groups. Beliefs that
members of different races have different talents and interests in the aggregate
support the use of qualified labor market figures, while beliefs that members of
different races would have similar aggregate aptitude for and interest in certain
jobs but for discrimination and segregation support broader use of population
figures in voluntary affirmative action plans.189 Grutter’s recognition of
intraracial variability suggests greater similarity across racial groups, and this
in turn supports the use of general labor market figures.190 Most significant is

184.

185.
186.
187.

188.

189.
190.

City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (internal quotation marks
omitted). But see id. at 541-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that discrimination can limit
minorities’ ability to develop skills and suggesting that the relevant labor market should be
the entire local labor force).
See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 633 n.10.
Id.
Id. at 632. Santa Clara had adopted general labor market figures for its long-term goals, but
formulated its annual short-term goals in accordance with the qualified labor market, id. at
635, and it was these latter goals at stake in Joyce’s hiring.
Grutter might even lend support to the use of national population figures, rather than local
labor market figures, as this would more readily foster integration by ensuring that firms do
not have an incentive to locate in areas with lower minority populations and encouraging
minorities to live in all areas of the country. But this would represent a significant departure
from Title VII law. See David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in
Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1655-56 (1991).
See id. at 1656.
Assuming that affirmative action not only counteracts current discrimination but also
compensates for lower qualifications stemming from past discrimination, raw aptitude may
not be enough. But a recent study suggests that employers can train beneficiaries of
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Grutter’s acknowledgement of the legitimacy and signaling functions of
integration. Workplace integration is not static but dynamic because it signals
to racial minorities that jobs are open to them and it is worthwhile to invest in
their human capital.191 To encourage such investment, minorities must be
present in institutions in significant numbers and not the potentially slight
numbers that reflect qualified labor market figures.
Finally, Grutter’s emphasis on critical mass suggests that employers might
use affirmative action not only to hire a few minority applicants, but also to
integrate their entire workforces. The concept of critical mass speaks to the
instrumental values that affirmative action fosters—such as breaking down
stereotypes and facilitating cross-racial understanding—and these values are no
less important to the workplace than to the university.192 Just as manifest
imbalance can supplement critical mass in the constitutional context, then, the
idea of critical mass can supplement manifest imbalance in the statutory
context, and Grutter offers Title VII courts another numerical benchmark with
which to evaluate integration.
This notion of critical mass instructs employers to look not only to the
correspondence between their employees and the area labor market, but also to
the internal composition of the workforce. Simply hiring one woman, as the
transportation agency did in Johnson, would not be enough.193 Even though
this hire brought the workforce slightly more in line with the relevant
demographics, it did not meaningfully further integration.194 As Grutter’s
concern with racially diverse leadership and institutional legitimacy
underscores, moreover, a critical mass of women or minorities in lower-level
jobs is not sufficient: Employers must also strive for significant minority
representation in upper-level jobs because “the chief mechanism of
redistribution appears to be increased minority power.”195

191.

192.
193.
194.

195.

affirmative action to compensate for lower qualifications, Harry J. Holzer & David
Neumark, What Does Affirmative Action Do?, 53 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 240, 269 (2000),
and Grutter’s emphasis on the ability of institutions to mold people offers some theoretical
support for this proposition.
See, e.g., Darity & Mason, supra note 174, at 84; Shelly J. Lundberg & Richard Startz, Private
Discrimination and Social Intervention in Competitive Labor Markets, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 340,
342-45 (1983); Strauss, supra note 188, at 1626-27.
See Estlund, supra note 3, at 37.
Cf. KANTER, supra note 33, at 282 (arguing for batch hiring).
As the only woman in her position, Joyce was subject to discriminatory harassment. Susan
Faludi, Diane Joyce, MS., Jan. 1988, at 62 (describing the harassment Joyce faced). See
generally Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998)
(analyzing the harassment of women in male-dominated workplaces).
Chambliss & Uggen, supra note 130, at 62 (emphasis omitted).
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Though it enriches the manifest imbalance standard, consideration of
critical mass remains true to Johnson’s demand that “sex or race . . . be taken
into account in a manner consistent with Title VII’s purpose of eliminating the
effects of employment discrimination.”196 One goal of Title VII was the
“prophylactic” objective that employers take affirmative steps to reduce
discrimination in their workplaces.197 Workplace integration mirrors this
statutory purpose, for integration and discrimination are dynamically related.
Discrimination causes underrepresentation, but so too, when minorities are
underrepresented in a workforce or upper-level jobs, discrimination against
them is more likely.198 Maintaining integrated workplaces therefore “remove[s]
barriers that have operated” to disadvantage minorities199 and best realizes
Title VII’s goals by shifting the focus of remediation to integration that ensures
a better future.
conclusion
Grutter has recharged debates about affirmative action and opened the door
for employers, as well as universities, to invoke diversity to justify their
affirmative action plans. The opinion encompasses two distinct visions of
diversity. The compelling-interest discussion champions diversity-asintegration—which casts racial diversity as a means to integrate civil society
and facilitate cross-racial connectedness—and adopts the numerical standard of
critical mass. Grutter’s narrow-tailoring analysis, by contrast, embraces
diversity-as-difference—which understands racial diversity as a proxy for
different viewpoints and backgrounds—and relies on subjective, individualized
consideration to achieve diversity.
Reading Grutter through the lens of Title VII doctrine helps resolve the
opinion’s internal contradictions. Employment discrimination law has long
attended to numerical representation and attempted to constrain subjectivity;
this reading therefore privileges diversity-as-integration over diversity-asdifference and critical mass over undisciplined subjective decisionmaking. Title
VII doctrine also complements the Court’s critical mass standard with its own
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198.
199.

Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 632 (1987).
E.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975); see Yelnosky, supra note 34.
The Court has increasingly emphasized this prophylactic purpose in holdings that
encourage employers to take preventative measures to avoid workplace discrimination. E.g.,
Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742 (1998).
See, e.g., KANTER, supra note 33, at 208-42; Yelnosky, supra note 34, at 1389-99.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
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manifest imbalance standard and suggests a demographically derived
benchmark for integration that falls between rigid quotas and the inwardlooking critical mass inquiry.
Given Grutter’s likely migration to the employment context, the stakes of
this critique are high not only for equal protection law, but more still for Title
VII doctrine. If employers rely on Grutter’s narrow-tailoring discussion, they
threaten to operationalize diversity-as-difference, and the diversity rationale
may backfire: Workplaces will remain stratified as employers seek to capitalize
on minorities’ diversity contributions and perhaps mute the importance of
racial diversity altogether. If, by contrast, employers rely on Grutter’s
compelling-interest discussion, they can make significant strides toward
meaningful integration. The Court’s embrace of diversity-as-integration
reaffirms contested Title VII precedent and emphasizes individual institutions’
responses to lingering racial segregation and hierarchy. The choice is stark.
Warning against diversity-as-difference and fleshing out the diversity-asintegration argument, this Note suggests that each employer can help effect
workplace and, ultimately, societal integration and thereby realize Title VII’s
fundamental commitments.
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